We determine the impact of free trade on the sustainability of an international environmental agreement (IEA) and incorporate it into the assessment of the net benefits of opening up to free trade. We show that such an analysis can reverse the conclusions reached within a standard oneshot game framework. We first examine a one shot game and show that the benefits from an increase in economic activity due to free trade outweigh the extra cost of free trade associated with larger environmental damage. We then consider the infinite repetition of the one-shot game where countries can use trigger strategies and show that there exist circumstances where an IEA is sustainable under autarky but not under free trade. This aggravates the environmental damages caused by free trade and leads to the possibility that welfare may be smaller under free trade than under autarky. This conclusion remains valid even when (i) countries adopt the most cooperative environmental policy when the "fully cooperative" environmental policy is not sustainable or (ii) we consider "intermediate tariff reductions."
Introduction
As the world economy has become increasingly integrated, there has been a growing concern over the e¤ects of international trade on the global environment. Environmentalists have generally considered international economic integration as a threat to adequate environmental regulation. It is often argued that freer trade cause more environmental degradation via an increase in consumption and production and via a strategic "race to the bottom"e¤ect of trade on the environment (a la Copeland and Taylor) in terms of environmental regulations.
While opening up to trade raises income and consumption levels, it also leads to a more polluted environment. As global economic integration intensi…es, the potential for con ‡ict becomes more transparent (see Lawrence et al., 1996; Dua and Esty, 1997) . Perhaps the best summary on the linkage between environment and trade is articulated by Bhagwati (1993) :
"...The environmentalists'antipathy to trade is perhaps inevitable. Trade has been central to economic thinking since Adam Smith discovered the virtues of specialization and of the markets that naturally sustain it. Because markets do not normally exist for the pursuit of environmental protection, they must be specially created. Trade therefore suggests abstention from governmental intervention, whereas environmentalism suggests its necessity."
Since the early 1990s, the connection between trade and environment has become a dominant international policy issue. 1 One of the main questions in the literature has been about the strategic distortions that trade introduces in designing environmental policies and the e¤ects that trade liberalization has on these distortions (see Kennedy, 1994; Barrett,1994b; Ulph, 1996a and 1996b; Burguet, 2003; Straume, 2006 and Baksi and Ray Chaudhuri, 2008) . It is argued that trade-related incentives tend to reduce environmental protection, although the distortions are likely to decrease as trade gets liberalized. 2 Many environmental problems -including global warming (climate change), marine pollution, ozone layer depletion and biodiversity loss -are transboundary and thus cannot e¤ectively be dealt with by any country alone. In such cases, while collective well-being can be increased with full cooperation in managing shared environmental resources, we know from the existing literature that two main factors severely limit the e¤ectiveness of environmental agreements. 3 First, the gains from environmental cooperation are typically examined through a comparison between a situation of complete non-cooperation and a situation of complete cooperation. However, a country would prefer a situation in which it behaves non-cooperatively while the other countries cooperate amongst themselves (thus allowing the non-cooperating country to free-ride on the improved environment). The second obstacle is the lack of a supranational authority with well de…ned and e¤ective enforcement powers. Based on these observations, we follow an in ‡uential stream of the literature, see e.g. Barrett (1994a) , Finus (2001) , Rubio and Ulph (2002) , and Ferrara et. al (2009) , and focus on IEAs within an in…nitely repeated game where an agreement is self sustainable through the use of trigger strategies. This approach seems the most appropriate since IEAs have to be self-enforcing in the sense that they are immune to unilateral deviations by the countries involved without requiring any external authority.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the implications of opening up to free trade when the resulting increase in economic activity is accompanied by environmental damages. To this end, we employ a simple oligopoly model of trade between two countries where the pollution generated is a transboundary public bad that a¤ects both countries equally, regardless of the point of origin. Our main contribution is to incorporate the sustainability of environmental cooperation in a repeated game into the welfare analysis of free trade versus autarky.
We …r s t derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a two stage one-shot game under autarky and under free trade. In the …r s t stage, countries choose -cooperatively or non cooperatively-their emission standards. In the second stage, taking the emission standards as given, …r m s compete a la Cournot in the product markets. In the one shot game, we …n d a result that is in line with the existing literature: larger social welfare (measured as the sum of consumers'surplus producers'surplus net of the environmental damage) is larger under free trade than under autarky; however this improvement is at the detriment of environmental quality. Moreover the losses from the absence of an IEA are larger under free trade than under autarky.
We then analyze the in…nite repetition of this one-shot game and determine whether an IEA is more likely to be sustainable under free trade than under autarky. Following the literature on trade and environmental agreements, we focus on self-enforcing agreements that are sustained by trigger strategies where countries cooperate until a deviation is observed, in which case, all countries revert back to the non-cooperative equilibrium. A country participates in a self-enforcing IEA when the bene…t of deviating from the cooperative abatement standard is outweighed by the future losses it would su¤er from the break down of cooperation. 4 We …r s t focus on the polar cases of cooperative and non-cooperative environmental policies. We …n d that while free trade raises both the environmental and welfare gains from an IEA relative to autarky, it makes an IEA less likely to be self-sustainable relative to autarky. This result implies that there exist circumstances where an IEA is sustainable under autarky but not under free trade. Under such a situation, free trade leads to an additional welfare cost that needs to be factored in the determination of the net social bene…t from free trade relative to autarky.
When the rate of increase of the marginal cost of abatement is su¢ ciently large, we show that the environmental damage e¤ect outweighs the pure trade e¤ect and countries lose from free trade relative to autarky.
We check the robustness of this main result along three directions. First, we consider the concept of the most cooperative environmental policy. Speci…cally, in the case where the discount rate is such that a fully cooperative environmental policy is not sustainable, we determine the most cooperative environmental policy that can still be sustainable. This approach is borrowed from the concept of the most cooperative tari¤ in trade agreements (see Chisik, 2003 and Saggi, 2006) . We then separately examine two distinct speci…cations 5 : i.e., the case of a linear damage cost of pollution and the case of 'i n t e r m e d i a t e tari¤s' where, instead of comparing the two limit cases of autarky versus free trade we consider the reduction of a common tari¤ on imports between the two countries. Our analysis provides a con…rmation of the result derived under the original speci…cation of the model: trade liberalization can diminish the set of parameters under which environmental cooperation is sustainable.
Basic Model
Consider a simple oligopoly model of trade where there are two countries, i and j, and two goods x and y. For simplicity, we assume that the inverse demand for good x in each country is linear:
where p i denotes the price and x i denotes the quantity of good x sold in country i. Good y is the numeraire good produced under perfect competition with constant returns to scale while good x is produced, in each country, by a single pro…t maximizing …r m . We call the …r m in country i (country j) …r m i (…rm j). For simplicity, the marginal costs of production for both …r m s are assumed to be constant and equal to zero. Following Ulph (1996a), we assume that there is no pollution associated with the numeraire good while each unit of x produced generates one unit of pollution emission and there exists a technology that allows for abatement. When country i's government imposes a cap on emissions via emission standards, denoted e i , abatement by …r m i is de…ned as follows:
where x iz denotes the sales of …r m i in country z. The cost of achieving an abatement level a i is: 5 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the investigation of these two cases.
with >0 denoting the rate of increase of the marginal cost of abatement.
We assume, as in Copeland and Taylor (1995) , that the generated pollution is a transboundary public bad that a¤ects both countries equally, regardless of the point of origin. The level of pollution in country i is given by E i = e i + e j . The damage to country i, denote by i , from a level of pollution E i is assumed to be:
We …r s t consider a two stage one shot game. In the …r s t stage, countries choose -cooperatively or non cooperatively-their emission standards. In the second stage, taking the emission standards as given, …r m s compete a la Cournot in the product markets. We derive a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) using backward induction.
One-Shot Game
We now compare the outcomes of the one shot game for two scenarios: autarky and free trade between countries i and j.
Autarky
Under autarky, …r m i takes the environmental policies (e i ; e j ) as given and maximizes the following pro…t function:
It is straightforward to determine the Cournot Nash equilibrium:
In the …r s t stage of the game, in the non-cooperative equilibrium, each country takes the environmental policy of the other country as given and determines its emission standard that maximizes its own welfare:
where
i and i (e i ; e j ) denote respectively country i's consumers'surplus, producer's surplus and the environmental damage. The …r s t order conditions (F.O.Cs) for an interior solution to the above problem can be written
Emission standards are strategic substitutes since:
Each country has an incentive to relax its environmental policy if the rival country adopts a more stringent environmental policy. From the F.O.Cs above, we obtain the non-cooperative equilibrium emission standard, denoted e A :
As the rate of increase of the marginal cost of abatement ( ) rises, each country has an incentive to loosen its environmental policy:
A denote welfare of a country under autarky in the absence of environmental cooperation:
Now, consider the scenario in which countries are engaged in an IEA whereby they determine their joint emission standards (denoted by e c A ) by maximizing the sum of their welfare: max e W W (e) = W i (e; e) + W j (e; e):
The F.O.C. for the above problem is
Using (13), we obtain:
It is immediate from (10) and (14) that, since an IEA internalizes the negative externality, environmental standards are more stringent under an IEA than under the absence of environmental cooperation:
Moreover we have
When an IEA is in place, a country's welfare under autarky is given by:
Free Trade
Suppose now that countries open up to trade and that there exist no trade costs or barriers. Firm i maximizes the following pro…t function:
and
(18) In the …r s t stage, countries simultaneously determine their emission standards under no cooperation. Country i solves the following problem:
The …r s t order condition for the above problem is given by
Thus, similar to autarky, e i and e j are strategic substitutes:
Thus, each country would relax its environmental policy if the rival country adopts a more stringent environmental policy. It is immediate from (9) and (21) that opening up to free trade increases the interdependency of environmental policy of countries and thus raises
due to the fact that pro…t shifting considerations arise under free trade while they do not exist under autarky. Using (20) and symmetry, we obtain the non-cooperative equilibrium emission standard, denoted by e F :
where @e F @ > 0 as under autarky. Now consider an IEA under free trade where countries jointly determine their standard:
and e c F is given by:
De…ning e F = e F e c F , we next show that an IEA leads to more stringent environmental standards relative to no agreement under free trade:
and W (e c F ) respectively denote the welfare of a country under free trade when there is no environmental cooperation and when there is an IEA. We have:
We l f a r e and Environmental Implications
In this section, we examine both social welfare and environmental implications of free trade relative to autarky under an IEA and no agreement. To this end, we …r s t consider the scenario where the IEA does not exist. While the damage e¤ect of the absence of environmental cooperation is present under both autarky and free trade, the pro…t shifting e¤ect of a change in environmental (14) and (24) that, under an IEA, countries choose a less stringent environmental policy under free trade relative to autarky:
We de…ne the "environmental gain" from an IEA as the change of total environmental damage relative to no agreement:
Similarly, we de…ne the "welfare gain" from an IEA under each regime:
We have: Proposition 1: Both welfare and environmental gains from an IEA are larger under free trade than under autarky:
The above proposition supports the popular belief that, both from welfare and environmental perspectives, there is more to gain from an IEA under free trade relative to autarky: free trade exacerbates the losses from the absence of an environmental agreements. Recently, it has been argued that environmental impacts should be addressed in international trade agreements. 6 However, although acknowledged, no speci…c solution to the problem of coordination over environmental policies is readily available. In what follows, we take into account the impact of opening up to free trade on the sustainability of an IEA, and then derive the welfare and environmental implications of free trade.
Sustaining Environmental Cooperation
We consider a supergame where the above one shot game is in…nitely repeated. It is well-known that countries may sustain the cooperative equilibrium by using trigger strategies provided that the discount rate of future periods is su¢ ciently small. The trigger strategies typically prescribe adopting the cooperative solution unless a defection is observed. Defection by any country results in the permanent breakdown of cooperation in which case countries revert to the non-cooperative equilibrium 7 . In every period, each country weighs the current bene…t of defecting from cooperation against the future cost of the breakdown of cooperation. If the current bene…t of defection is less than the discounted life-time cost of defection for each country, no country has an incentive to deviate from the cooperative solution and thus cooperation is sustainable.
Since we examine whether an IEA is more likely to be sustainable under free trade than under autarky, we …r s t determine the threshold levels of the discount factors under autarky and free trade, denoted by A and F respectively, beyond which an IEA is sustainable. We then compare these two critical discount factors.
To determine the bene…t from defection under a regime Z where Z = A; F , we …r s t …n d the optimum emission standard of the defecting country (denoted by e d Z ) while the other country uses the cooperative standard (e c Z ). Let W i (e c Z ; e c Z ) denote the per period welfare of country i under an IEA in a regime Z = A; F ;
denote the per period welfare of country i when it defects from e c Z and sets e d Z given that country j sets e c Z in a regime Z = A; F and W i (e Z ; e Z ) denote the per period welfare of country i under no cooperation in a regime Z = A; F .
Autarky
We determine the threshold level of the discount factor, denoted A , beyond which an IEA is self-sustainable under autarky. Given the symmetric nature of our model, it is su¢ cient to consider country i's defection problem only:
The solution to the above problem is:
Using (14), (22) 
As defection by any country results in the permanent breakdown of the agreement with each country reverting back to e A , the per period cost of defection equals to the di¤erence between the one-period welfare under an IEA and the one-period welfare under no agreement:
For cooperation to be sustainable, the current bene…t of defection must be less than the discounted life-time cost of defection for each country. Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint must hold:
where denotes the discount factor so that 1 C i (e A ; e c A ) measures country i's permanent cost of defection. the critical discount factor A corresponds to the solution of B i (e d A ; e c A ) = 1 C i (e A ; e c A ):
Lemma 1: An IEA is self-sustainable under autarky if and only if A .
It is immediate from (37) that an IEA is more likely to be self-sustainable under autarky when the rate of increase of the marginal cost of abatement ( ) rises:
This is due to the fact that, as increases, the cost of defection rises more than the bene…t from defection:
Free Trade
We now turn to the threshold level of the discount factor, denoted F , beyond which an IEA is sustainable under free trade and compare it to A . We say that an IEA is less (more) likely to be sustainable under free trade than under autarky when F > A ( F <
The solution to the above problem yields
As under autarky, it is immediate from (22), (24) and (39) 
The critical discount factor F obtains as follows:
Lemma 2: An IEA is self-sustainable under free trade if and only if F holds.
We now address our main question: is an IEA easier or harder to sustain under free trade?
Proposition 2: The range of discount factors over which an IEA is self-sustainable is smaller under free trade relative to autarky: In order to understand the above result, we examine the behavior of the bene…t and cost of defection per period under each regime. The opening of trade increases both the bene…ts (i.e. welfare gain from defecting) and the costs of defection (i.e. the forgone welfare gain from cooperation). To determine the net impact of trade on the cooperation versus defection tradeo¤ we need to compare the ratios . These two ratios can be expressed as convex (quadratic) increasing functions of respectively . Note that F and A represent the expansion of emissions of a defector relative to the expansion of emissions under non-cooperation (once cooperation breaks down) respectively under free trade and autarky. Compared to autarky, the presence of a pro…t shifting e¤ect under free trade raises the sensitivity of countries'emission standards on each other by strengthening the strategic substitutability of emissions standards, i.e. 
The above proposition (illustrated in Figure 1 ) establishes that, while free trade raises both the environmental and welfare gains from an IEA relative to autarky, it makes an IEA less likely to be self-sustainable. Let b denote the actual (given) discount factor, we can distinguish three scenarios: Since an IEA is sustainable under autarky but not under free trade when F > b > A holds, free trade bears an additional cost relative to autarky and it must be factored in when accounting for the net bene…t of opening up to free trade.
We l f a r e Implications
We …r s t consider scenario (i) where an IEA is self-sustainable under both regimes. While less stringent environmental standards arise under free trade relative to autarky e c A < e c F , countries always bene…t from free trade relative to autarky: (44) The above result along with (29) provides support for the idea that the bene…t from opening up to trade comes at the expense of the environment even when an environmental agreement is in place under free trade. Now consider scenario (ii) where an IEA is self-sustainable under autarky but not under free trade. Once we compare the welfare level under autarky with an IEA (W i (e c A ; e c A )) with the one under free trade with no environmental cooperation (W i (e F ; e F )), we …n d that countries gain from free trade relative to autarky when the degree of abatement cost's convexity is su¢ ciently small (see Figure 2 ):
Finally, consider scenario (iii) where an IEA is not self-sustainable under both autarky and free trade. Similar to scenario (ii), when the rate of increase in marginal cost of abatement is su¢ ciently large, we show that the environmental damage e¤ect outweighs the pure trade e¤ect and countries lose from free trade relative to autarky (see …g u r e 3): It is important to note that whenever free trade dominates autarky from a social welfare perspective, the gain comes at the expense of the environmental quality. When is su¢ ciently large and the actual discount factor is su¢ ciently small, autarky not only yields higher social welfare but also better environmental quality relative to free trade.
So far, we have followed the existing literature and focused on the two polar cases where either countries can implement the cooperative outcome or they fail and the non-cooperative outcome prevails. 8 In reality given a discount factor, even though implementing the fully cooperative outcome is not sustainable, countries may opt for an agreement with an 'i n t e r m e d i a t e ' level of cooperation that is sustainable. 
Most Cooperative Environmental Policy
We consider the possibility where countries can sign an IEA with the most cooperative environmental policy when an 'o p t i m a l l y designed' IEA is not sustainable under a trade regime. Given a level of the discount factor, we …n d the lowest symmetric emission standards (denoted by e c F and e c A ) for which cooperation is acceptable to both countries and the incentive compatibility constraint in (36) just binds: B i (e d Z ; e c Z ) = 1 C i (e Z ; e c Z ).
Autarky
When an 'o p t i m a l l y designed IEA'is not self-sustainable under autarky ( b < A ), countries can agree on a cooperative emission standard e c A that is higher than the optimum cooperative standard e c A and lower than the equilibrium non-cooperative standard e A . Then, country i's defection problem becomes:
The solution to the above problem corresponds to the defection standards, denoted e d A :
It is straightforward to …n d the per period cost and bene…t from defection: We examine below the same possibility under free trade. 
Free Trade
The solution to the above problem yields e d F as a function of e c F : Given these standards e d F and e c F , the per period cost and bene…t from defection are as follows:
It is straightforward to …n d e c F that solves We obtain the following results under free trade: (i) as countries become more patient, they are willing to cooperate on a lower (more stringent) emission standard under free trade:
(ii) as the discount factor converges to zero, e c F approaches to e F :
Note that the above analysis implies that, when b < F , welfare under free trade with a cooperative standard e c F (as stated above) is given by: > 0. The …r s t part of the above proposition establishes that, irrespective of whether a self-sustainable IEA is optimally designed or not, free trade leads to the loosening of emission standards and the worsening of environmental quality. This is in line with our previous result that any welfare gain from free trade comes at the expense of the environmental quality. In light of Proposition 4, a natural follow-up question is: would the higher environmental damage under free trade be enough for autarky to dominate free trade from a social welfare perspective? The second part of Proposition 4 provides a negative answer to this question when the rate of increase in marginal cost of abatement is su¢ ciently low ( < ). Under such a case, the pure trade e¤ect dominates the indirect environmental damage e¤ect. However, autarky yields a higher welfare than free trade when (i) the rate of increase of the marginal cost of abatement is su¢ ciently large ( > ) and (ii) countries are su¢ ciently impatient ( b < e ).
Further Discussion
In this section, we separately consider two modi…cations in the assumptions used in the model, namely (i) a change in functional form of environmental damages (a linear form instead of quadratic) and (ii) instead of focusing on the limit cases of free trade and autarky, we consider intermediate tari¤s with trade liberalization viewed as a decrease in tari¤ levels. We show below that, in both cases, it is still true that an IEA can be more di¢ cult to sustain under free trade than under autarky.
Linear Damage
Suppose that the damage caused by emissions is given by
To ensure an interior solution for emission standards, we assume that <
: the rate of increase of the marginal cost of abatement is not too large. Similarly, to guarantee positive output levels given the optimum emission standards, we assume that >2 holds.
In this subsection, in order to di¤erentiate our notation for the linear damage case, we use a subscript L in reporting optimum and equilibrium emission standards.
Autarky
Given the fact that the second stage of the game remains the same as under strictly convex damage function, we directly move to the …r s t stage where each country determines its emission standard to maximize welfare:
The F.O.C for an interior solution to the above problem yields
Thus, when there is no trade and when the damage function is linear, we …n d that countries' emission standards are independent of each other:
= 0. Using the F.O.Cs above, we obtain the following non-cooperative equilibrium emission standard and welfare:
When countries are engaged in an IEA, they determine their joint emission standards:
Since an IEA internalizes the negative externality, environmental standards are more stringent under an IEA relative to no agreement,
and each country's welfare under an IEA becomes
We can now compute the welfare gain from an IEA under autarky:
Since countries'emission standards are independant of one another, it is immediate that e and thus the per period bene…t from defection equals the per period cost of defection
and therefore A = 1 2 (68)
Free Trade
When countries open up to free trade, unlike autarky, emission standards become strategic substitutes even under a linear damage function. This di¤er-ence stems from the fact that there exists a pro…t shifting motive under free trade while it does not exist under autarky. The emission standards under non cooperation and cooperation are respectively given by: 
An IEA leads to more stringent environmental standards and increases welfare: 
It is immediate from (64), (66), (71) and (72) that the qualitative result in Proposition 1 extends to the case where the damage function is linear: both social welfare and environmental gains from an IEA are larger under free trade than under autarky:
Unlike autarky, emission standards are strategic substitutes and the solution to a country's defection problem leads to: 
= e The critical discount factor 
Both the bene…t from defection and the cost of defection are larger under free trade relative to autarky. However, given the fact that emission standards are independent under autarky while they are strategic substitutes under free trade (due to the presence of pro…t shifting), the bene…t-cost ratio is larger under the latter regime:
; e 
the range of discount factors over which an IEA is self-sustainable is smaller under free trade relative to autarky.
Intermediate Tari ¤s
In order to capture the impact of bilateral trade liberalization on the sustainability of an IEA, we assume that …r m s face a symmetric and exogenously given ad valorem import tari¤ t while exporting. We revert to our original speci…cation of quadratic damage and abatement cost functions and for convenience 10 we …x the value of to 2: i = (e i +e j ) 2 2 and C i (a i ) = a 2 i .
Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
We …r s t consider the two stage non-cooperative game. In the …r s t stage, taking the import tari¤ as given, each country chooses its emission standards that maximize its own welfare (de…ned as the sum of consumers'surplus, producer's surplus and tari¤ revenue net of the damage caused by pollution). Then, taking the environmental standards (e h (t); e f (t)) and t as given, …r m s compete a la 10 Fixing the value of to 2 is to avoid presenting very cumbersome expressions and still allows us to show that the qualitative conclusions of our analysis can derived within the case of tari¤ reductions from 'i n t e r m e d i a t e ' t a r i ¤ levels.
Cournot in each market. Using backward induction, we obtain a SPNE. In the second stage, …r m i maximizes the following pro…t function
2 )] 3(7 5t)(5 3t) (79)
From (79) we note that, when e h (t) = e f (t) = 0, x ij (t) = 0 if t 1 3 . Hereafter, we exclude the prohibitive tari¤s and assume that t < 1 3 . It is immediate from (79) that when a country adopts a more stringent environmental policy, its domestic …r m 's reduces its domestic and export output levels:
> 0. In the …r s t stage of the game, countries simultaneously determine their emission standards:
where e = [e i ; e j ] is the vector of emission standards. Given that welfare is a quadratic function of emission standards, it is convenient to write the …r s t order conditions (F.O.Cs) for the above problem as follows:
and the second order condition for the welfare maximization is satis…ed:
From the F.O.Cs above, we obtain the non-cooperative equilibrium emission standard, denoted by e i :
Di¤erentiation of e i (t) w.r.t. t yields that countries have incentives to follow more lax environmental policy as trade gets liberalized:
< 0. This result provides support for the environmentalists' concerns that any move towards international economic integration is at the detriment of adequate environmental regulation. 
In contrast to the non-cooperative case, environmental policy becomes more stringent under cooperation as trade gets liberalized: @e c (t) @t > 0. Note that, since @e (t) @t < 0 and @e c (t) @t > 0 hold, the gap between environmental pollution emissions, denoted by e(t) = e i (t) e c (t), widens as trade gets liberalized:
@ e(t) @t < 0. Therefore, interpreting (t) = [e (t)] [e c (t)] as the "environmental gain" under an IEA, we …n d that, consistent with the popular belief, trade liberalization does indeed necessarily increase the need for an international environmental policy coordination from both environmental and welfare perspectives.
Trade Liberalization and Self-Sustaining IEAs
Consider country i's defection problem: max
Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the large literature devoted to the welfare implications of free trade when economic activities generate pollution which causes a transboundary damage. Our main contribution is to incorporate the impact of free trade on the sustainability of environmental agreements into the assessment of the net bene…ts of opening up to free trade. We have demonstrated that this impact of free trade can be signi…cant and reverse the conclusions reached in the analysis of a standard one-shot game. More speci…cally, while in the one shot game version of our international pollution trade game, the bene…ts from the increase in economic activity due to free trade outweigh the extra cost of free trade associated with larger environmental damage, in the case of a repeated game, free trade can prevent the sustainability of an IEA that would be sustainable under autarky. This aggravates the environmental damages caused by free trade and leads to the possibility that welfare under free trade may be smaller than under autarky.
When the IEA prescribing the adoption of the 'i d e a l ' e n v i r o n m e n t a l standards (that maximize world welfare) is not self-sustainable, countries may still agree on alternate 'a c c e p t a b l e ' environmental standards such that the resulting IEA is self-sustainable. We showed that, even when the most cooperative standards are considered, it is still possible that autarky dominates free trade from a social welfare perspective. This result was also shown to hold under two other alternative speci…cations: the case of a linear damage function of emissions and the case of 'i n t e r m e d i a t e tari¤s' and trade liberalization where instead of comparing the limit cases of free trade and autarky we consider a decrease of tari¤s from a given intermediate level.
We have followed the main stream of the literature on IEAs and have assumed that trigger strategies are credible. Examining our results when strategies are requited to be renegotiation-proof would constitute an interesting future research question.
